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Abstract: This paper presents a frequency-based method for detecting replay attacks and its application
to a multiple tank system. This method introduces a sinusoidal signal with a time-varying frequency
(authentication signature) into the closed-loop system and checks whether the output signal is compatible
with the signature or not. The effectiveness of the method is illustrated through simulation scenarios
using a 9-tank system under different situations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Current societies depend on complex engineering systems with
interconnected components working together, which are known
as critical infrastructure systems (CISs). Among the most im-
portant CISs, there are water supply systems (WSSs), which are
increasing in complexity and dimensions in order to meet the
demands of both industry and normal life in growing cities. Due
to the interaction between physical elements in the real world
and computing elements in the cyber world, WSSs are con-
sidered nowadays cyber-physical systems (CPSs) (Park et al.,
2012, Kim and Kumar, 2012, Shi et al., 2011), which consist of
interconnected subsystems that interact through control, com-
munication, and computation (Wei and Li, 2015).
WSSs are vulnerable to the potential threats brought by nat-
ural hazards and terrorism, which may cause temporary dis-
ruptions that affect other infrastructures, e.g. the ones devoted
to the generation of electrical power (Haimes et al., 1998). In
particular, although the application of CPSs to modern WSSs
grants superior reliability, autonomy, and efficiency, it creates
risks for cyber-physical attacks (Rasekh et al., 2016), which
can violate the consumers’ privacy, cause intentional damage
to the physical water assets (pumps, valves, tanks), decrease
the water supply, or impact the water quality (Taormina et al.,
2017). A remarkable attack to a water facility happened in 2000
at Maroochy Water Services (Queensland, Australia), affecting
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the SCADA of a sewage system, which caused the release of
almost one million liters of wastewater into waterways and
parks (Slay and Miller, 2007). Other relevant incidents are the
Pennsylvania Water Company hack in 2006, as well as the
Florida’s Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District hack, and
the computer malfunction blamed for major sewage spill into
the Tijuana River in 2012. These events have motivated recent
research on cyber security in water systems, see for example
Amin et al. (2013b,a), Laszka et al. (2017), Taormina et al.
(2017), Ahmed et al. (2017).
Among the most critical cyber-physical attack, there are the
replay attacks. When an attack of this type is carried out, at first
the attacker records the measurements coming from the sensors.
Then, in a subsequent phase of the attack, the attacker replaces
the real data with the recorded one, causing deterioration of
the control system’s performance and potentially allowing other
types of attacks without being discovered. In the last few years,
different approaches have been proposed to detect these attacks,
e.g. statistical detection (Mo and Sinopoli, 2009), receding-
horizon control (Zhu and Martı́nez, 2014), data-driven methods
(Ma et al., 2017), quantized signals (Kashima and Inoue, 2015)
and spectral estimation (Tang et al., 2015).
The main contribution of this paper is to present a method to
detect replay attacks using a frequency-based signature and to
demonstrate its application to a multiple (nine) tank system,
which is described by a complex, highly interconnected and
nonlinear model. This method introduces a sinusoidal signal
with a time-varying frequency (authentication signal) into the
closed-loop system, and checks whether the time profile of the
frequency components in the output signals are compatible with
the authentication signal or not, by comparing the energies of
appropriate signals.
The interest of considering a multiple tank system comes from
the fact that this type of system may serve as a first approx-
imation for modeling a portion of a WSS (Georgescu et al.,
2010, Ormsbee and Lansey, 1994) and, more generally, as an
example of decentralized control system (Johansson, 2000). It
is worth mentioning that multiple tank systems are common
testbeds for diagnostic monitoring techniques in fault tolerant
control (Buciakowski et al., 2017) and cyber security (Gawand
et al., 2015, 2017).
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes the frequency-based method for detection of replay
attacks. Section 3 presents the application of the proposed
method to a multiple tank system. The simulation results are
presented in Section 4. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn
in Section 5.
2. REPLAY ATTACK DETECTION METHOD
2.1 Attack definition and overview of the detection method
The replay attack is a type of cyber attack that affects the output
of a system, denoted in the following as y(t), and is carried out
in two stages:
(1) the attacker gathers the data without disturbing the system,
starting from time t0 until t0+w, where w is the size of the
attack window;
(2) at time t1, the attacker begins to replay the collected data,
such that the real data in the intervals [t1 +(N f −1)w, t1 +
N f w],N f ∈ N,N f ≥ 1, is replaced with the data recorded
in stage 1.
Since control systems are not resilient to replay attacks, there
is a need to develop methods to detect them. The method
presented hereafter introduces a sinusoidal signal with a time-
varying frequency (signature) into the system and detects if the
measured output is compatible with the introduced signature
or not. Using a dynamic decoupling technique based on vector
fitting (VF) (Gustavsen and Semlyen, 1999), it is assured that
a signature introduced on a specific input channel will affect
only an output. By comparing the energies of band-pass filtered
signals, an estimation of the frequency-varying profile in the
signature is obtained, which is used by the detector to determine
if a replay attack is being carried or not.
2.2 Signal generation
Let us consider a linear system described by the following
equations
ẋ(t) = Ax(t)+Bu(t) (1)
y(t) =Cx(t) (2)
which, together with a linear state-feedback law of the type
u(t) =−Kx(t), leads to a closed-loop system
ẋ(t) = (A−BK)x(t) (3)
The signature ς(t) is introduced in the input u(t) as an addi-
tional signal, such that u(t) =−Kx(t)+ ς(t) and
x(t) = (A−BK)x(t)+Bς(t) (4)
As stated previously, it is desirable to establish a bijection
between the available inputs and the available outputs, such that
the effect of an element of ς(t) will be observed only on the as-
sociated output. Since the closed-loop transfer matrix from ς(t)
to y(t), i.e. G(s) =C (sI−A+BK)−1 B is coupled, a decoupler
F(s) must be introduced such that the series interconnection
Gd(s) = G(s)F(s) is dynamically decoupled (approximately
diagonal) at the frequencies ωi, i = 1, . . . ,N. By requiring that
F(ιωi) = G(ιωi)−1, a set of N constraints that the decoupler
should satisfy is obtained. Then, F(s) can be obtained by ap-
plying VF (Gustavsen and Semlyen, 1999), a robust numerical
method for rational approximation in the frequency domain
using poles and residues.
Each element of the input to the decoupler F(s), denoted in the
following as ς̃(t), is chosen as a frequency-varying sinusoidal
signal
ς̃l(t) = α̃l cos(ωσl(t)t) l = 1, . . . ,nu (5)
where α̃l denotes the magnitude, while σl(t) denotes a piece-
wise constant signal, which takes integer values between 1
and N, such that at each instant of time ωσl(t) equals one of
the frequencies ωi, i = 1, . . . ,N, for which F(s) achieves the
decoupling. It is assumed that σl(t) takes a random value be-
tween 1 and N at equally-spaced time instants t( j)s , j ∈N0, with
t(0)s = 0 and t
( j+1)
s − t( j)s = Ts, where Ts is the switching period.
The piecewise constant signal σl(t) is completely known by
the detector, whereas the attacker does not have access to this
information.
2.3 Detector logic
In order to analyze the content of y(t) at the frequencies ωi,
i = 1, . . . ,N, used to generate the signature signal ς̃(t), the












where ωi acts as a peak frequency and Qi is the selectivity
of the filter. In general, to a higher value of Qi corresponds a
narrower frequency response ‖Hi(s)‖ around ωi, even though
higher values of Qi will also lead to a slower dynamic response.
Let us denote the output of the band-pass filter with peak
frequency ωi and input yl(t) as zil(t). Then, the replay attack
detection algorithm compares the known signal σl(t) with
σ̂l(t), which is an estimation of σl(t) based on the signals zil(t),
i = 1, . . . ,N. In particular, if σ̂l(t) = σl(t), then the algorithm
will state that no replay attack is affecting the output yl(t),
while if σ̂l(t) 6= σl(t), the algorithm will warn about yl(t) being
corrupted by a replay attack.
The way of calculating the signal σ̂l(t) will affect the effec-
tiveness of the algorithm. A possibility to do so is to compare
the energies of different zil(t) over the largest period associated






and choose σ̂l(t) as the index corresponding to the signal with
the biggest energy. However, when a change in the frequency of
the signal ωσl(t) in (5) occurs, the system will exhibit a transient
behavior with respect to the signal ς̃(t). For this reason, a
proper choice for obtaining the signal σ̂l(t) is to take into
account the time needed for the transient to become neglectable,
denoted as ttrans, and calculate σ̂l(t) as (8) (see top of the next
page), where t∗s = bt/TscTs denotes the last switching time.
It is worth noting that, since the band-pass filters Hi(s) deter-
mine the frequency content of the output signals, a reasonable
σ̂l(t) =






















Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the nine tank process.
estimation of ttrans is given by the biggest among the settling
times of Hi(s), i = 1, . . . ,N.
3. APPLICATION TO A MULTIPLE TANK SYSTEM
In this section, the application of the proposed method to a
multiple tank system made up by nine tanks, interconnected as
shown in Fig. 1, is presented.
3.1 Nonlinear model
The system in Fig. 1 is described by a ninth order state space
model, where the states variables xi, i = 1, . . . ,9, are the liq-
uid levels of each tank, while u1, u2, u3 represent the inputs
(voltages applied to the pumps). Under the assumption that
the water flow at the inlet of each valve is equally distributed
among its outlets, the nonlinear state space model is obtained

































































φi j = αi jsgn(xi− x j)
√
2g|xi− x j| (19)
with αi, αi j denoting the orifice coefficients of each tank or in-
terconnection of tanks, and g denoting the gravity acceleration.
3.2 Linearization around an equilibrium point
By applying a constant input ue, a steady-state equilibrium
point is reached, denoted in the following as xe. A linearized
model can be found by considering deviations ∆x of the state
variables from the equilibrium point xe, and performing a first


























∣∣xi− x j∣∣ =−ϕi j(xi,x j) (22)








































































In particular, by considering the parameters α1 = α2 = α3 =
0.20, α4 = α5 = α6 = 0.35 and α7 = α8 = α9 = 0.50, and the
input ue = [2,3.5,3]T , which corresponds to the equilibrium
point xe = [1.08,0.94,0.74,1.40,2.32,1.30,1.42,1.84,1.67]T ,
equations (23)-(31) can be expressed in a form akin to (1)




−0.73 0.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.30 −1.01 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.25 −0.76 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.21 0.15 0 −0.77 0.12 0 0 0 0
0.21 0.15 0.26 0.12 −0.73 0.11 0 0 0
0 0.15 0.26 0 0.11 −0.79 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.66 0 0 −1.10 0.17 0
0 0 0 0 0.51 0 0.17 −1.26 0.27
0 0 0 0 0 0.68 0 0.27 −1.13

B =
 0 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 00 1/4 0 1/4 0 1/4 0 1/4 0
1/3 0 0 0 1/3 0 0 0 1/3
T
which, together with a linear error-feedback law of the type
∆u(t) =−K∆x(t), with controller gain designed by pole assign-
ment as
K =
 −6.48 −3.62 0.79 0.01 6.47 4.67 −1.62 −0.55 0.14−4.56 −3.96 −3.79 2.23 0.88 5.66 4.34 4.90 4.56
−0.27 −4.94 −8.39 12.24 9.14 −4.16 −0.90 −2.28 −2.78

leads to a closed-loop system
∆̇x(t) = (A−BK)∆x(t) (33)
In the following, we will assume that the tank levels x7,x8,x9
are monitored by a supervision station, which can be hacked
through a replay attack. For this reason, the equation (2) is
characterized by the output matrix
C =
 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

or, equivalently, by defining ∆y(t) = y(t)− ye = y(t)−Cxe
∆y(t) =C∆x(t) (34)
3.3 Application of the method
Let us consider a replay attack detector, as described in the
previous section, with N = 2, and ω2 = 2ω1. In order to choose
appropriately the parameters α̃1, α̃2, α̃3 and ω1, let us note that,













where ᾱ1, ᾱ2, ᾱ3 denote the maximum magnitudes of ς1(t),
ς2(t), ς3(t) and max is understood as an element-wise maxi-
mum. By requiring that ᾱl ≤ κlue,l , l = 1, . . . ,nu, where κl  1
and ue,l is the l-th element of ue, in order to make the effect
of the signature signal on u(t) much smaller than ue, such that
the attacker does not realize about its presence, then a set of
feasible frequencies can be calculated, and ω1 can be chosen
as the maximum value among these frequencies. Note that the
higher the values of κl , l = 1, . . . ,nu, are chosen, the smaller
becomes the set of feasible frequencies among which ω1 can
be chosen, which provides a rule of thumb for choosing the
magnitude of the elements of the signature signal ς(t) (it is
desirable that these elements are chosen as big as possible, in
order for the effect of ς(t) on ∆y(t) to overcome the effect of
exogenous disturbances and measurement noise).
According to this reasoning, by using κ1 = κ2 = κ3 = 1/10,
the following values have been found: α̃1 = 0.012, α̃2 = 0.016,
α̃3 = 0.021, ω1 = 1.6rad/s, which corresponds to Tω = 4s.
Then, by requiring an attenuation of −20dB at frequency ω2
for the first band-pass filter, and at frequency ω1 for the second
band-pass filter, the selectivity parameters are calculated as
Q1 = Q2 = 2
√
11. Following Section 2.2, the specification of
dynamic decoupling for the frequencies ω1 and ω2 = 2ω1 is
satisfied if F(s) is chosen such that
F(ιω1) =




 9.05+7.90ι −1.90+1.45ι 0.04−0.27ι−1.23+1.07ι 14.04+9.48ι −2.18+1.73ι
−0.23−0.01ι −1.92+1.61ι 9.57+7.60ι

By applying the VFIT3 routine 1 , which is an implementation
of fast relaxed VF (Gustavsen and Semlyen, 1999, Gustavsen,






















which achieves the above specification, as demonstrated in
Fig. 2, where a comparison between the magnitude Bode plot
of the non-decoupled (blue line) and the decoupled one (red
line) is depicted. It can be seen that, at the frequencies ω1
and ω2, the series interconnection G(s)F(s) approximates an
identity matrix, such that a good decoupling is achieved. Then,
following the discussion in Section 2.3, ttrans is calculated as






































































Fig. 2. Decoupling (Bode plot).
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed strategy,
three different simulation scenarios are considered.
4.1 Scenario 1
In the first scenario, the system is working without replay
attacks being performed. In Fig. 3, the outputs of the band-
pass filters zil(t), i = 1,2, l = 1,2,3, are plotted with the
1 https://www.sintef.no/projectweb/vectfit




















































































Fig. 3. Scenario 1. Outputs of the band-pass filters zil(t) and
varying frequency ωσ (t).






















Fig. 4. Scenario 1. Result of the replay attack detection test.
signals ωσ1(t), ωσ2(t), ωσ3(t), which determine the time-varying
frequency profile of the signal (5). It can be seen that z1l(t)
is the signal with the strongest energy when ωσl = ω1 =
1.6rad/s, while z2l(t) is the strongest signal when ωσl = ω2 =
3.2rad/s. Using (8), σ̂1(t), σ̂2(t) and σ̂3(t) are calculated, and
by comparing them with σ1(t), σ2(t) and σ3(t), respectively,
the information about the absence of replay attacks is obtained,
as shown in Fig. 4.
4.2 Scenario 2
In the second scenario, it is assumed that an attacker records
the measurements of the first output in the first 200s and then
replays the recorded data periodically starting from t = 200s.
In this case, the signals zi1(t) do not follow anymore the profile
of ωσ1(t), as shown in Fig. 5. By detecting a mismatch between
σ1(t) and σ̂1(t) (see Fig. 6), a replay attack affecting the first
output channel is detected at time 204.1s.
4.3 Scenario 3
In the third scenario, both y2(t) and y3(t) are corrupted by the
replay attack starting from t = 200s. The resulting outputs of
the band-pass filters zil(t) are plotted in Fig. 7, together with
the varying frequencies ωσl(t). The mismatches σ̂2(t) 6= σ2(t)
and σ̂3(t) 6= σ3(t) allow detecting the replay attacks affecting
































































































Fig. 5. Scenario 2. Outputs of the band-pass filters zil(t) and
varying frequency ωσ (t).






















Fig. 6. Scenario 2. Result of the replay attack detection test.
































































































Fig. 7. Scenario 3. Outputs of the band-pass filters zil(t) and
varying frequency ωσ (t).
the second and the third output channel at t = 205.6s and
t = 428.6s, respectively. Note that the algorithm needs a longer
time to detect the replay attack in the third output channel
since until the time t = 392.5s, the profile of the randomly
generated signal σ3(t) matches with the one in the recorded
data (σ3(t) = 1).






















Fig. 8. Scenario 3. Result of the replay attack detection test.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This work has presented an innovative method for detecting
replay attacks based on adding a frequency-based authentica-
tion signature and its application to a complex and nonlinear
system, i.e. a multiple tank system, made up by nine highly in-
terconnected tanks. Three simulation scenarios have illustrated
the main characteristics of the method, which is capable of not
triggering false alarms while being able to identify successfully
which output channels have been corrupted by replay attacks.
Future work will aim at extending the method to descriptor
systems, in order to apply it to a more realistic model of water
supply network.
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